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Nobody seems to have expected the so-called “sui generis” process of state-building in 
Kosovo would result in “sui generis” events and (mis)conceptions regarding fundamental 
issues of constitutionality and constitutional justice. Until now, almost all authors I have read 
praise the so-called internationalized constitutionality and constitutional justice in Kosovo. 
But these articles disregard the main issues with what has happened and is happening in 
Kosovo. It is the main goal of this contribution to enlighten the real and non-mentioned 
aspects of the fragile constitutional justice in Kosovo. 
The constitutional order of the Republic of Kosovo is a product of the so called “Ahtisaari 
Plan”, a unilateral status settlement proposal and the outcome of the failed Kosovo-Serbia 
negotiations regarding the status of Kosovo. The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement was drafted by Martti Ahtisaari and laid out the main pillars on which the 
new constitution of Kosovo had to be based. The new constitution was intended to serve as a 
guide to building a democratic state as well as a fundament for guaranteeing human rights and 
freedoms, specifically making provision for privileges for, and special protection of, ethnic 
minorities (on a level exceeding international standards). In this regard, the Constitutional 
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Court would also therefore have a special role to play. It would have to be the carrier of 
political power following the path “predestined” for it in the Constitution. The events that 
took place in the first decade of independent constitutional justice in Kosovo however, raise 
many questions about whether the Court has fulfilled this role as a transformative actor and 
guardian of constitutional and conventional guarantees. 
Conventionalism through constitutionalism and the multi-national composition of the 
Court 
According to the Constitution of Kosovo, the Constitutional Court is comprised of nine 
judges. During the provisional period, six judges had to be elected by the parliament (two of 
which had to represent ethnic minorities), while three judges had to be appointed by the 
International Civilian Representative, upon consultation with the President of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  
The intention was that the international judges appointed to the court would guide the 
Kosovar members of the Court, as these national judges lacked experience in constitutional 
justice adjudication. While some of international judges appointed to the Court brought 
relevant experience, including experience serving on the European Court of Human Rights 
and at the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, other appointments 
were questionable. One such questionable appointment is the appointment of an American 
judge with little experience relevant to an understanding of the constitutional system of 
Kosovo and European human rights and freedoms. In fact, as later came to light, this judge 
spent more time in the USA than in Kosovo during his tenure at the Court. When the 
European Anti-Fraud Office started, as a result of this, investigations into the European Rule 
of Law Mission in Kosovo, he resigned. 
The Court was also supported by international legal advisors, these advisors however came 
from countries that do not have constitutional courts. Therefore, the so-called 
“internationalization” of the composition of the Court served to ensure it was composed of 
multiple nationalities and ethnicities, but without fully serving the underlying purpose for 
inclusion of foreign judges and advisors on the Court. The purpose behind inclusion of 
foreign judges was not multi-national representation but the transfer of skills, gained through 
experience in judges’ countries of origin, in order to support the Courts’ establishment and 
functioning. 
On the other hand, Article 22 of the Constitution of Kosovo contains a catalogue of 
international human rights documents which are directly applicable in Kosovo. Article 53 of 
the Constitution provides that the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) is supreme 
in the hierarchy of norms in Kosovo. Despite Kosovo not being a member of the Council of 
Europe, the constitutionalization without ratification of the ECHR has resulted in the ECHR 
becoming the highest, and almost only, reference for the interpretation of human rights and 
freedoms and, rather problematically, in the ECtHR being regarded as a role model regarding 
work and organization in all manner of proceedings before the Kosovo Constitutional Court. 
This expansive interpretation of Article 53 of the Constitution was the result of influence by 
international judges and international legal advisors on the Court. The Court held that it is 
obliged to follow precedents of the ECtHR in all its decisions in a case related to the interim 
measures and not in a case in which Article 53 arose. 
Over the same period, the Court “assessed” the “conventionality” of decisions or acts of 
public authorities, parliamentary laws, governmental acts or municipal statutes. In fact, while 
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the Court filled its decisions with references to ECtHR jurisprudence, it failed to fully canvas 
the facts and allegations of the applicants. Consequently, ECtHR jurisprudence is relied on by 
the Court as a mechanism for avoiding the material assessment of the referral (see cases KO 
47/16,  KO 118/16 and KI 141/16). 
Collision of diverse legal systems 
The so-called transplantation of law is a process mostly known in countries in transition. 
Heike Jung argues in her article Recht und kulturelle Identität – Anmerkungen zur Rezeption, 
Transplantation und Diffusion von Recht, that transplantation occurs when countries 
accelerate the state-building process – causing unexpected effects. This is what happened in 
Kosovo. 
The controversial development of constitutional justice in Kosovo was caused by the 
influence of other legal systems during the establishment of the Court. On one hand, the 
German model was adopted, through the Constitution and the Law on the Constitutional 
Court, for the structure, models of constitutional control and jurisdiction. On the other hand, 
the rules of procedure of the Court where drafted with the support of USAID, which resulted 
in American concepts influencing the rules of procedure, further complicating matters. In 
addition, as explained above, the ECHR and ECtHR where given a superior role. 
The Kosovo Constitutional Court has been described as following a Kelsenian model, it 
therefore considers itself to be the guardian of the Constitution, with clearly established 
jurisdiction (both in terms of the Constitution and parliamentary law). As noted above, rules 
on procedures of the Court where influenced by American concepts. According to Article 2(2) 
of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the rules of proceedings must be in compliance with 
this law. Yet in practice an internal act of the Court has been given the character of a 
constitutional amendment, not by name – but by nature. This is because rules on procedure 
stand despite being in conflict with constitutional provisions relating to the admissibility of 
referrals, internal proceedings, deadlines for decisions etcetera (compare for example Rule 39 
of the Rules of Procedure with Article 113 of Constitution and with the Law on the 
Constitutional Court). 
The uncontrollable “controller” 
The establishment of the Constitutional Court, like other processes in Kosovo, was not only 
undertaken with the support of, but also under the instruction of, the international 
community.  In particular, the USA and EU played key roles in the founding of Kosovo as a 
sovereign country. Therefore, they made a crucial mistake in establishing the Court 
immediately after independence was declared and the Constitution was adopted. Kosovo 
should have followed the example of Italy, where the Constitutional Court was established 
eight years after the new constitution entered into force. The Court would then not have 
needed international judges and would have operated from the beginning as a national 
constitutional court (which obviously differs by nature, structure, jurisdiction, role and 
function from the ECtRH as an international human rights court). 
Further, Kosovo should have limited the application of international human rights treaties to 
instances in which applicants relied directly on rights guaranteed by these documents, and 
therefore also to application in international human right tribunals. The application of these 
treaties would then have been in compliance with constitutional principles and they would 
have assumed the correct place in the hierarchy of norms (correct within a European 
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continental legal system). Therefore, the ECHR, and other regional treaties, would have 
supplemented the constitutional rights and freedoms provided by Constitution. Further, direct 
interpretation and application of the ECHR would have been left to the ECtHR.  
Hegel defines despotism as a situation in which individual acts supersede and overcome 
“constitutional provisions”. The Constitutional Court of Kosovo, by avoiding the direct 
application of constitutional provisions and by taking the place of a legislator, has failed to 
establish itself as the guardian of the Constitution in Kosovo. As result, Kosovo is not only an 
example of constitutional justice failure, but also of judicial despotism. 
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